Is There Really a Need for the Proposed Elite Strike Force?
[This is a guest article by a defense analyst]
The creation of an elite strike force composed of selected personnel from the Philippine National Police and the Armed Forces of the Philippines is a classic example of the saying that the road to hell is paved with good intentions. The PNP and the AFP will provide 200 soldiers each to the proposed unit as called for by President Benigno Aquino III which will be about the size of an infantry battalion. What is obvious in this proposed set up is its amateurishness and lack of any understanding of the fundamental difference between the police and military. A casual observer would notice that a policeman and a soldier share a lot of similarities. Both have guns and uniforms. However there are fundamental differences. It does not mean that if the term “special” is found in PNP and AFP units it automatically means that both are exactly the same. A policeman is trained to uphold the law and as much as possible use deadly force as a last resort. A soldier once committed is trained to kill and not incapacitate. A soldier cannot simply arrest criminals whereas a policeman can. Allowing a soldier to arrest increases the chances of him becoming politicized as he begins to intrude upon areas reserved only for civilian agencies. That then makes a soldier believe that civilian agencies cannot function properly without the support of the military and he may then think that it is possible then to take over the affairs of state since after all civil authority is not anymore functioning. Given the politicized nature of the Philippine military, it becomes foolhardy to adopt a policy that allows soldiers to participate in police functions especially when the PNP is not short of resources and capabilities. The obverse is if you make a policeman operate with a soldier it will make the former end up being militarized in his outlook.
The proposal does not answer to the pressing problem of the need of the PNP to implement a coherent policy of addressing the miserable performance of its municipal SWAT units and of the abysmal command and control set up that occurs all to frequently during operations. In fact it skirts the issue and allows the PNP to default on the responsibility. A common occurrence in the bureaucracy is to pass the buck as a means to make somebody else handle the task at hand. Considering that what prompted the president to issue the call for the creation of this proposed unit was a simple hostage taking incident involving a single perpetrator then does this set the precedent as to the types of operation it will be involved in? Will that unit then be at the beck and call of every single municipality no matter how minor the incident is? Consider the statement of the president quoted in the news:
“…Mr. Aquino himself said that he had already spoken with the chiefs of the military and the police to form the elite unit. He indicated in an earlier news conference that it would be better to concentrate resources on a few highly trained soldiers than have the necessary logistics spread over too many Special Weapons and Tactics teams or SWAT units. “So, I already discussed this with Director General [Jesus] Verzosa, and also the Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Ricardo David, that both of their units will be organized and will operate on a national basis but perhaps on a smaller scale so we can properly maintain them,” President Aquino said…”
A question that arises is who will command this unique unit? Will it be a PNP official or an AFP officer? Would the training and professional experience then have an effect on the manner of command? A PNP officer would command in a much different way than an AFP officer given the vast difference police training is as compared to military training. Now granted that the unit is created and it is employed. Would the system keep the unit at its battalion configuration or would it eventually morph into something large and instead of one battalion there will be a proposal to create two more to cover Visayas and Mindanao and the rationale would be that it would be more responsive to emergency situations? Now if that happens, the battalion would turn into a brigade sized unit with the expected request to make the commander a general.
Now what then happens to all those PNP units such as the SWAT and of course the SAF? Will they still be supported? The problem with the proposal to create an elite unit is that it undermines the policy of resolving problems at the lower levels before the national level is called in. The purpose of this policy is to prevent the national government from being bogged down in local affairs and instead concentrate on the task of national governance. If a barangay tanod can resolve it then he must before he calls in the police. And so on and so forth up until it reaches the municipal level and upwards. However, there will be this urge to pass on everything to that elite unit with the reasoning that the units present in the locale are not capable due to shortages of this and that. It would also be reasonable to assume that resources will be poured into this elite unit at the expense of municipal level formations.
There is really no need for this elite unit as there is no need to reinvent the wheel. Existing units are enough. The equipment and training they need are not beyond the capability of the national government to provide to each and every major municipality in the country. Priorities may be set on training and supply to account for areas where high profile targets exist such as in Metro Manila and other large cities, tourist spots and vital installations. It will then be the task of Camp Crame to monitor the training and support of these units and see to it that standards are met especially in command, control and planning through exercises in the field and other types of simulation. Simply put, this country does not need another general to command another unit floating in a plethora of similar formations.
My sources tell me that there were at least two other highly trained and fully equipped units who were more than capable of doing the job. Both volunteered to go into action but their help was declined due to politics. Thus, ego and ambition resulted in tragedy.
The creation of a new force is simply a big show to assure the public that our leaders are taking action. It will cost money but will do nothing to tackle the root of the problem.
We can talk for years about the tactical mistakes made as events unfolded. However, the real cause of our failure that day is simple: those in charge put their own interests first.
There is something good that can come out of this fiasco. In 1986 the U.S. Congress after conducting an extensive inquiry into the failure of the Desert One rescue operation in 1980, passed the Goldwater-Nichols Amendment to the Defense Act which effectively created the separate branch of the Joint Special Operations Command. JSOC was given umbrella command authority over all the services special operations forces such as Delta, Green Berets, Navy Seals, AFSOC, except marine MEU-SOC. As a result, incidents requiring the deployment of special ops forces are now under JOINT COMMAND of JSOC. This was contrasted to Desert One wherein all the inter services rivalries came out and caused command and control to suffer and thus mission failure.
We can learn something from this. As I was informed by several spec ops groups, the MPD actually refused assistance and due to outright hubris decided to conduct the assault itself – even if MPD was unprepared and ill-equipped. Command and control was handed over to a mayor, who as a civilian was not supposed to take part in the operation. A joint Special operations command could have solved this problem. Yes we do have a special operations command here but it does not work the same as in the U.S., as was proven by the Quirino Incident.
Also, we must distinguish between domestic and overseas intervention. The U.S. has the Posse Commitatus Act which forbids military forces from operating within the mainland U.S. Thus for local disturbances, the U.S. use the FBI Hostrage Rescue team (HRT), and various local SWAT units. Local disturbances are crimes, hence a police matter, so the military units really ought not to intervene.
….or something similar may not be practical here. The PNP regularly requests support from the AFP when the opposition force, like the ASG has heavy firepower. Besides, the Philippines is not at war with any other nation. Does the ASG, NPA, MILF or MNLF have belligerent status? If none, the could be treated as armed bandits.
For a time, a few years ago, the functions of the PNP were removed from engaging in counterinsurgency against the NPA and muslim rebels. However, that has since been restored. SO now the both the PNP and Military engage in counterinsurgency.
During FVRs term, the PNP was delegated ALL THESE TASKS, leaving the AFP to fight only external threats. These were quietly set aside after an incident where an entire unit of the much touted SAF were surrounded by Muslim rebels and surrendered The timely rescue by Marines saved them from annihilation and further humiliation.
Maybe the special strike force is similar to GIGN.(French: Groupe d’Intervention de la Gendarmerie Nationale), is theFrench Gendarmerie‘s elite Special Operationscounter-terrorism and hostage rescue unit; it is part of the military force called the Gendarmerie. Even if its members belong to the military, they are now charged with police duties outside urbanised areas. As such, GIGN units are closer to enhanced SWAT teams than to pure military units such as the British Army‘s Special Air Service. Its operators are trained to follow police regulations and include negotiation and investigation specialists.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Groupe_d'Intervention_de_la_Gendarmerie_Nationale
Yes from what I understand the GIGN is a para-military force, though designated as national police (Gendarmerie). As a result, they still use Manurhin 357 magnum revolvers instead of autos in keeping with their quasi-civilian nature. Al though in the Marseilles rescue, the assault team members carried whatever they wanted from Sig-Sauer P228s to Glock 17s.
Despite ‘Posse Commitatus Act, Delta operators also get involved in domestic crisis ie. 1999 Seattle WTO conference. So our AFP can pos get involved in certain crisis situations. That call would prob be up to the Prez.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Delta_Force
In a word, no.
The *cough* men in charge just need to get over their jurisdictional pissing contest.