One issue that was raised in the recent Luneta Hostage incident was how come other SWAT teams and units were not allowed to participate in the rescue?

Jurisdiction or the power to take charge of the incident is a sensitive issue. The general rule is that in a purely civilian hostage or terrorist incident, the local police force of the area wherein the incident occurs, has jurisdiction over the matter. For whatever reason, the local police may REQUEST an outside unit or military force to assist, but until such assistance is requested, the outside unit has no jurisdiction to act. Pride, hubris, and rivalry can be a factor here and adversely affect the rescue operation. One such example was the failed rescue operation of the U.S. at Desert One, Iran, in 1980. No one among the Navy, Air Force, or Army was effectively in charge of the operation, which gave rise to a later Congressional inquiry which led to the Goldwater-Nichols Amendment establishing the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC). In contrast, during the SAS hostage rescue at Princes Gate in 1980, jurisdiction had in fact been formally turned over in writing to the SAS commander Gen Sir Michael Rose by London Metropolitan Police after several days of failed negotiations, and under orders by the Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher herself who gave the order to assault. [A copy of that formal written order granting the SAS jurisdiction is now framed and hung at SAS headquarters in Hereford, England.]

There are however inter-service and inter-agency rivalries which make the task of coordination more difficult. The PNP normally will not work with the NBI in such a task, unless to simply share intelligence or information. The army will normally not work with the marines, in such tasks, unless there is an overall task force formed for the task, such as during the 1999 assault on Camp Abubakar, which was under the direct command of then AFP Chief of Staff Gen Angelo Reyes. Among PNP units, there are also rivalries between SAF and the different SWAT units.

In regions wherein there is rampant insurgency, the issue of jurisdiction has become a gray area. Thus, in places like Jolo and Basilan or other similar regions, the local PNP and military normally coordinate and act as one due to the high level or threat and rebellion. For example, during the Lamitan Hospital Hostage Siege, a motley of Army, PNP, and Civilian Geographical units all participated in the battle. Normally such would have been a PNP matter, however since the matter is tied in with terrorist act and rebellion, the military simply stepped in. Also, at that time all the forces, whether PNP of Army, were under the umbrella command of a task force commander under direct orders from the President.

For the sake of efficiency, nobody actually cares WHO does the job or WHO GETS THE CREDIT. What is important is that the rescue is done properly with minimum damage and loss of life. For this reason, a JOINT NATIONAL COMMAND AND CONTROL CRISIS BODY must be established, which has jurisdiction over ALL agencies and branches of law enforcement and the military, to determine which agency or unit shall be utilized negotiation, surveillance, and possible hostage rescue assault. This Joint Crisis Body shall have the power to OVERRIDE the local police jurisdiction and take command and control of the situation, and order other more equipped and qualified units to take over, if in its discretion intervention is necessary, such as in high profile hostage taking and terrorist incidents. The existing national Security Council is a good place to start.